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THE ARYAN BROTHERHOOD, CRAWFORD, AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY 
[A]nd Festus put Paul’s case before the king.  “There is a man here” he said 
“whom Felix left behind in custody, and while I was in Jerusalem the chief 
priests and elders of the Jews laid information against him, demanding his 
condemnation.  But I told them that Romans are not in the habit of 
surrendering any man, until the accused confronts his accusers and is given an 
opportunity to defend himself against the charge.  So they came here with me, 
and I wasted no time but took my seat on the tribunal the very next day and 
had the man brought in.  When confronted with him, his accusers did not 
charge him with any of the crimes I had expected . . . .”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Roman Governor Festus insisted on having accusers meet accused 
face-to-face nearly two millennia ago; however, the theoretical propositions 
invoked in his bold statement are the very rights preserved in the U.S. 
Constitution.2  In the absence of Supreme Court precedent, however, courts 
have struggled to interpret the scope of the so-called “Confrontation Clause” 
with any amount of certainty or confidence.3  In the recently decided case of 
Crawford v. Washington,4 the Supreme Court reviewed and essentially 
redirected the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause courts had been using 
for nearly twenty-five years.5  Rather than citing necessity and “indicia of 
 
 1. Acts 25:14–18 (The Jerusalem Bible); see Howard W. Anderson III, Davis v. 
Washington Narrows the Scope of “Testimonial” Hearsay, 95 ILL. B.J. 546 (2007). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence.”) (emphasis added). 
 3. See United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (calling the 
issue of deciding when the Sixth Amendment applies in capital cases “difficult”); see also John 
G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1967, 1969 (2005) (“[T]he Court has never answered the basic textual question whether the 
Sixth Amendment—which applies ‘in all criminal prosecutions’—applies to capital sentencing at 
all.”). 
 4. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 5. Id. at 53 (“In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial 
hearsay, that is its primary object . . . .”). 
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reliability” when admitting or refusing to admit declarants’ statements into 
evidence,6 the Court found the pivotal focus to be whether the nature of the 
statements was testimonial or non-testimonial.7  The decision in Davis v. 
Washington followed Crawford by attempting to define what “testimonial” and 
“non-testimonial” statements were.8 
While the Crawford and Davis opinions certainly attempted to define the 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause in this context, they refrained from 
deciding when a defendant has the right to be “confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”9  The language of the Sixth Amendment clearly states that 
confrontation is required “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,”10 yet Crawford and 
Davis involved non-capital cases and thus only apply definitively to trial 
phases in criminal proceedings.11  Thus, although a defendant first undergoes a 
“trial phase” and then, a “penalty phase” (if convicted) in federal capital 
proceedings, Crawford and Davis were ambiguous as to what a “criminal 
proceeding” was under the Sixth Amendment.12  Moreover, because the 
penalty phase itself can be divided into the two separate portions of eligibility 
and selection, a key issue becomes whether the Confrontation Clause should 
extend to one, both, or neither.13  In United States v. Mills, the Honorable 
Judge David O. Carter14 grappled with several of these difficult questions 
 
 6. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980) (“In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not 
present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that 
he is unavailable.  Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of 
reliability.’  Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception.  In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a 
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”), abrogated by Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 7. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
 8. See generally Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (forming a basis of 
understanding for “testimonial” and “non-testimonial” statements). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Douglass, supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 11. Davis, 547 U.S. at 818, 820 (stating Davis was charged with the felony violation of a 
“domestic no-contact order” and Hershel was charged with “domestic battery and with violating 
his probation”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (stating Crawford was charged with “assault and 
attempted murder”). 
 12. See United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (posing the 
question as to when the Confrontation Clause applies in light of Crawford); supra note 3 and 
accompanying text. 
 13. See Donald M. Houser, Reconciling Ring v. Arizona with the Current Structure of the 
Federal Capital Murder Trial: The Case for Trifurcation, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 349, 363–65 
(2007), for an explanation of trifurcation and how it may remedy the complexity arising in the 
sentencing phase of capital cases. 
 14. Judge Carter has led an inspiring life, graduating with honors from UCLA in 1967, 
serving as First Lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1966–69, receiving the Bronze Medal 
and Purple Heart Medal, and receiving his J.D. from UCLA in 1972.  He served as Senior Trial 
Attorney in Homicides at the Orange County District Attorney’s office, and later as a Superior 
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pertaining to the Confrontation Clause, among them, its general applicability to 
the penalty phase and its extension to the eligibility and selection phases.15 
Part I of this Comment will first offer a history of the Aryan Brotherhood 
to provide context for the implications and importance of Mills.  Part II will 
review the impact Crawford and Davis have had on the Confrontation Clause.  
Part III will examine pertinent decisions dealing with the general application of 
the Sixth Amendment to the penalty phase in capital proceedings, the Federal 
Death Penalty Act (FDPA), and the courts previously dealing with the 
application of the Confrontation Clause to the penalty phase.  Next, the holding 
in Mills that the Confrontation Clause applies to the penalty phase of a capital 
trial during both the eligibility and selection portions will be reviewed in Part 
IV.  In Part V, this Comment will critically analyze the Mills holding and 
examine its implications, concluding: (1) the Mills court ruled correctly to 
apply the Confrontation Clause to the penalty phase in its entirety; and (2) the 
Mills court’s logical progression was somewhat tenuous, yet acceptable.  
Finally, the conclusion will explain the overall implication Mills has on the 
penalty phase of capital proceedings and the extent to which the holding in 
Mills can affect cases to come. 
I.  HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ARYAN BROTHERHOOD 
A. The History of “The Brand” 
On August 28, 2002, Assistant United States Attorney Gregory Jessner 
indicted forty suspected members and associates of a predominantly white 
prison gang known as “The Brand” or the “Aryan Brotherhood.”16  The 
indictment, running 110 pages in length, declared that the government would 
be seeking the death penalty for twenty-three defendants—rendering this the 
largest death penalty case in the history of the American justice system.17  
Allegations of “stabbings, strangulations, poisonings, contract hits, conspiracy 
to commit murder, extortion, robbery, and narcotics trafficking”18 are scattered 
throughout this epic indictment, painting horrific scenes that the Government 
pledged to prosecute.  The government invoked the Racketeer Influenced and 
 
Court Judge in Orange County, California from 1982–99.  Judge Carter has served as District 
Judge, Central District of California, from 1999–present.  THE AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF 
THE NATION 279 (Diana R. Irvine et al. eds., 17th ed. 2007). 
 15. See Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1127–39. 
 16. David Grann, The Brand, NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 2004, at 156, 158.  For an updated 
version of the indictment, see First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 
2d 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (CR 02–938(E)). 
 17. Grann, supra note 16, at 158. 
 18. Id.  Allegedly, the “hits” were ordered on victims both inside and outside of maximum-
security prisons.  William Lobdell & Christine Hanley, Aryan Inmate Capital Trials to Start, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006, at B1. 
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Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),19 likening the Aryan Brotherhood less to a 
prison gang and more to a national and intricate criminal enterprise.20  Under 
RICO, not only are those being charged with murder eligible for the death 
penalty, but those ordering or transmitting any order for the murder are also 
eligible for the death penalty.21 
The Brand’s origins date to 1964 at the San Quentin State Prison, where it 
was formed in response to “the racially charged 1960s” for the purpose of 
white inmates “protect[ing] themselves.”22  Along with gangs such as the 
Black Guerilla Family, La Nuestra Familia, and the Mexican Mafia, the Aryan 
Brotherhood was in a “full-fledged race war” by 1975.23  In an effort to cut 
down the violence raging throughout the California prison system, authorities 
attempted to separate the gangs in 1982.24  While the desired effect was 
separation and a cessation of violence, the prosecution believed the Palm Hall 
unit at the California Institution for Men at Chino, which served as a new home 
for a number of Aryan Brotherhood members, allowed the gang to take on a 
“hierarchical enterprise with a strict code of conduct.”25  Soon after, it is 
believed the Aryan Brotherhood formalized a federal branch in addition to its 
California branch, and Barry Mills and T. D. Bingham stepped to the fore of 
the gang’s ranks to lead as “high commissioners.”26  The prosecution charged 
that for the next two decades the three-man commission, of which Mills and 
Bingham were a part, was responsible for ordering “dozens of hits.”27 
B. The Trial 
The first four of the defendants named in the 2002 indictment to go to trial 
were Barry “The Baron” Mills, Tyler “The Hulk” Bingham, Edgar “Snail” 
Hevle, and Christopher Gibson.28  On July 29, 2006, after over four months of 
trial,29 a jury found all four guilty.30  Mills and Bingham were found guilty of 
 
 19. 18 U.S.C. §§1961–1968 (2006). 
 20. Grann, supra note 16, at 169.  An evidentiary advantage to using RICO is that members 
in the enterprise are necessarily partakers in the enterprise’s conspiracy, allowing for the 
possibility of out-of-court statements to be admitted into evidence as an exception to hearsay.  18 
U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(1), 1961 (2006); see also § 3591(a)(1)(C); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
 21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(1), 1961 (2006); see also § 3591(a)(1)(C). 
 22. Tori Richards, Trials Seek to Crush Aryan Brotherhood, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 14, 2006, at 
A1. 
 23. Grann, supra note 16, at 158–59. 
 24. Joe Mozingo, Prison Gang Trial Reveals a Treacherous World, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
2006, at B1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Grann, supra note 16, at 160–62. 
 27. Lobdell & Hanley, supra note 18. 
 28. Grann, supra note 16, at 160; Tori Richards, Aryan Brotherhood Leaders Are Convicted 
in Murders, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at A11. 
 29. The date of opening arguments was March 14, 2006.  Richards, supra note 22. 
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conspiring to murder Frank Joyner and Abdul Salaam at the United States 
Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1997.31  In seeking the death 
penalty for both Mills and Bingham, the Government revealed its intention to 
prove non-statutory aggravating factors under the Federal Death Penalty Act 
(FDPA)32 by admitting, among others, presentence investigation reports, post-
sentence reports, Institution Discipline Committee (IDC) reports, prison 
records of convictions, internal prison memoranda, and grand jury testimony.33  
As this Comment will discuss, the Mills Court found that Crawford and the 
Confrontation Clause applied to both the eligibility and selection phases.34  
Consequently, much of this evidence was ruled inadmissible because 
defendants Mills and Bingham would be deprived of their right to confront 
their accusers were the court to admit the out-of-court statements.35 
II.  CRAWFORD’S IMPACT ON THE  CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
A. Roberts and “Indicia of Reliability” 
In the landmark case of Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court attempted to 
answer definitively the question of when the Confrontation Clause bars the 
admission of evidence.36  The Roberts Court focused on the way in which the 
Confrontation Clause limited evidence otherwise admissible under an 
exception to the rule against hearsay.37  The Court called attention to the 
importance of the “means of testing accuracy”38 and applied an “indicia of 
reliability” requirement to determine whether an out-of-court statement 
violated the Confrontation Clause.39  After a showing of unavailability, 
adequate “indicia of reliability” will render an out-of-court statement 
admissible, and according to the Court, “[r]eliability can be inferred without 
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception.  In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a 
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”40  Thus, Roberts 
 
 30. Richards, supra note 28. 
 31. United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 32. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3593 (2006). 
 33. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1135–40. 
 34. Id. at 1131. 
 35. See id. at 1136, 1138, 1140. 
 36. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 37. Id. at 65.  The Court referred to the “truism that ‘hearsay rules and the Confrontation 
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values’ and ‘stem from the same roots.’”  Id. at 
66 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 
(1970)). 
 38. Id. at 64, 66 (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 65–66. 
 40. Id. at 66. 
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seemed to relieve the Confrontation Clause of any independent significance, 
rendering it coextensive with the firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. 
B. Crawford: An Entirely New Outlook on Confrontation 
The Supreme Court drastically changed the assessment of a defendant’s 
rights in Crawford v. Washington.  Rather than applying Roberts to settle the 
controversy debated among the lower courts, the Court went a step further by 
effectively overruling Roberts and its “amorphous notions of reliability.”41  
After reciting English and American histories of the Confrontation Clause, 
Justice Scalia (writing for the majority) used the 1828 version of Webster’s 
Dictionary of the English Language and argued that the text of the 
Confrontation Clause reflected the original emphasis of “witnesses” being 
those who “bear testimony.”42  Similarly, Justice Scalia noted that 
“‘testimony’” was defined as “‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for 
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”43  Thus, the Court heavily 
relied on the history and text of the Confrontation Clause in determining 
whether the statement was testimonial or non-testimonial.44 
However, Justice Scalia, in following historical exceptions as closely as 
possible, found that prior opportunity for cross-examination and unavailability 
allow for a statement to meet Confrontation Clause requirements for 
admissibility of testimonial statements: 
  Where nontestmonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the 
Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay 
law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such 
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.  Where testimonial 
evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the 
common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.45 
 
 41. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 63.  Justice Scalia conceded that the Supreme Court “could 
resolve this case by simply reweighing the ‘reliability factors’ under Roberts and finding that 
Sylvia Crawford’s statement falls short.” Id. at 67.  However, Scalia indicated that Roberts and 
previous interpretations of the Confrontation Clause revealed “a fundamental failure on [the 
Supreme Court’s] part to interpret the Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint on 
judicial discretion.” Id.   For more language asserting Crawford as overruling Roberts, see id. at 
69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“I dissent from the Court’s decision to overrule Ohio v. 
Roberts.” (citation omitted)); see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 n.4 (2006) (“We 
overruled Roberts in Crawford by restoring the unavailability and cross-examination 
requirements.”). 
 42. Id. at 51 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43. Id. (citations omitted). 
 44. Id. at 53 (“In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial 
hearsay, that is its primary object . . . .”). 
 45. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).  Justice Scalia argues that this is “faithful to the Framers’ 
understanding.” Id. at 59. 
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Where testimonial evidence was involved, the procedural process of cross-
examination was the vehicle by which reliability would be delivered.46  Thus, 
rather than the Confrontation Clause and hearsay being decided simultaneously 
in a single inquiry, an out-of-court statement must meet the requirements of the 
two separate inquiries of the Confrontation Clause and of a hearsay analysis.  
However, the Court remained silent as to whether the Confrontation Clause 
should apply to sentencing hearings.47 
C. Davis: Defining “Testimonial” and “Non-Testimonial” 
Just two years later, the Supreme Court attempted to define the terms 
“testimonial” and “non-testimonial” in Davis v. Washington.48  After briefly 
discussing the Confrontation Clause and Crawford, Justice Scalia (writing for 
the majority) stated: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  
They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is 
no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation 
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.49 
Interestingly, this inquiry fixes upon the purpose of the interrogation per 
analysis of the declarant’s statements and “not the interrogator’s questions.”50  
In applying this rule to the facts of Davis, Justice Scalia focused on: (1) the 
description of events “as they were actually happening, rather than 
‘describ[ing] past events’”; (2) whether a reasonable person would find the 
situation to be an “ongoing emergency” (“a call for help against a bona fide 
physical threat”); (3) whether the elicited statements were “necessary . . . to 
resolve the present emergency” or to learn “what had happened in the past”; 
and (4) whether the declarant’s statements were either frantic or calm.51  
However, the Davis Court was silent on the issue of Crawford’s application (or 
lack thereof) to sentencing hearings.52 
 
 46. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“[T]he Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of 
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.  It commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed . . . by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”); see also Penny J. White, “He Said,” “She Said,” and Issues of Life and Death: 
The Right to Confrontation at Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 387, 423–
24 (2007) (highlighting the importance of cross-examination). 
 47. See Douglass, supra note 3, at 1969. 
 48. 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (argued March 20, 2006, and decided June 19, 2006). 
 49. Id. at 822 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at 822–23 n.1. 
 51. Id. at 827 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 52. See Douglass, supra note 3, at 1969. 
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Nevertheless, as it stands today, the primary question as to the 
admissibility of out-of-court statements is whether the statements are 
testimonial or non-testimonial.53  If the statements are testimonial, they may 
still be admitted into evidence if the witness is sufficiently unavailable and 
there has been a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.54 
III.  THE BREADTH OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Now that Crawford’s impact on the Confrontation Clause has been 
explored, the breadth or scope of the right to confront one’s accusers must be 
examined.  First, Supreme Court decisions dealing with the issue of 
confrontation during a capital sentencing hearing will be discussed.  Second, it 
will be necessary to look briefly at the change to what has become known as 
“constitutionally significant factfinding” in recent Supreme Court decisions.  
Third, the FDPA’s language will reveal what kind of evidence is deemed 
admissible.  Fourth, a pre-Crawford decision will show the application of the 
Sixth Amendment to the various parts of the penalty phase in a capital 
proceeding.  Fifth, post-Crawford decisions will demonstrate how courts have 
grappled with the issue of applying the Confrontation Clause to the penalty 
phase of capital proceedings. 
A. Williams and Gardner: Confrontation Clause in Capital Sentencing 
Hearings 
Courts largely cite Williams v. New York55 when holding the Confrontation 
Clause does not apply during the sentencing phase in a death-penalty case.56  
In Williams, the Supreme Court affirmed a death sentence imposed by a judge 
who not only went against the jury’s unanimous recommendation for life-
imprisonment but also considered material not admitted into evidence.57  The 
Court stated, “[T]he punishment should fit the offender and not merely the 
crime,”58 and claimed, “The due-process clause should not be treated as a 
device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial 
procedure.”59  Thus, the Court found the rules of evidence should not apply to 
the penalty phase of a trial, no matter if that penalty phase carries with it the 
possibility of death.60  Justices Rutledge and Murphy noted in their dissent that 
 
 53. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 54. See id. 
 55. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 56. White, supra note 46, at 402. 
 57. Williams, 337 U.S. at 252; see also id. at 252–53 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. at 247 (majority opinion). 
 59. Id. at 251. 
 60. See id. (“It is urged, however, that we should draw a constitutional distinction as to the 
procedure for obtaining information where the death sentence is imposed.  We cannot accept the 
contention.”). 
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due process ensured a defendant’s right to be “accorded a fair hearing through 
all the stages of the proceedings against him.61 
Nearly thirty years later in Gardner v. Florida, the Supreme Court 
addressed a situation remarkably similar to Williams—but distinguished 
Williams and held for the defendant.62  In Gardner, the jury returned an 
advisory verdict to the judge, recommending the defendant receive life because 
the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors.63  The judge 
consulted a presentence investigation report (which the judge ordered and 
received after the jury’s recommendation was delivered) and imposed a death 
sentence on the defendant.64  The Government contended Williams controlled 
and was directly applicable to the facts of Gardner.65 
The Court declined to apply Williams and proceeded to distinguish the 
Gardner facts.66  The Court relied on two points: (1) the defendant in Gardner 
had no opportunity to challenge the presentence investigation report, which 
was absent from the record; and (2) the evolution of the death penalty.67  
Justice Stevens, delivering the majority opinion, noted that in the intervening 
thirty-year period between Williams and Gardner, “five Members of the Court 
have now expressly recognized that death is a different kind of punishment 
from any other which may be imposed in this country.”68  He further noted, “It 
is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision 
to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than 
caprice or emotion.”69  Justice Stevens declared that due process, while not an 
“entire panoply of criminal trial procedural rights,” applied to the sentencing 
process.70  The purpose was to provide “quality” and not just “quantity” of 
information to the judge, so that the sentencing court can be relatively free 
from “the average rumor or item of gossip.”71  The overarching purpose of 
disclosing the presentence investigation report to the defense was reliability in 
 
 61. Id. at 253 (Murphy, J., dissenting ) (emphasis added). 
 62. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357, 362 (1977).  For an excellent comparison of 
Gardner and Williams, see White, supra note 46, at 403–10. 
 63. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 352–53.  Interestingly, a significant mitigating factor was that the 
defendant’s level of intoxication before committing the offenses was such that he could not even 
remember the assault.  Id. at 352. 
 64. Id. at 353. 
 65. Id. at 355. 
 66. Id. at 356 (“[It is] clear that the holding of Williams is not directly applicable to this 
case.”). 
 67. Id. at 356–57. 
 68. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (discussing, 
in an extensive opinion, the notion that “death is different”). 
 69. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358. 
 70. Id. at 359 n.9. 
 71. Id. at 359. 
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a case of life and death.72  While courts to this day may have to decide whether 
to follow Williams or Gardner, the general trend is to follow Williams so long 
as all information is disclosed to the defense.73 
B. Apprendi, Ring, and “Constitutionally Significant Factfinding” 
In the decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey74 and Ring v. Arizona,75 the 
Supreme Court called attention to constitutional safeguards that were to be 
afforded to a defendant if certain kinds of factfinding were to be taking place. 
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court found that a New Jersey judge’s 
legislatively prescribed ability to impose a sentencing enhancement for hate 
crimes was unconstitutional.76  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated, 
“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for 
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”77  The “practice” of allowing a judge 
to make separate findings of fact by a preponderance of the evidence to 
enhance the sentence of a conviction “cannot stand.”78 
Ring applied the rationale of Apprendi in striking down an Arizona statute 
allowing a judge to make a finding of at least one aggravating factor after a 
jury delivered a guilty verdict for the crime committed.79  The Ring Court 
reasoned, “The dispositive question . . . is one not of form, but of effect . . . . If 
a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent 
on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be 
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”80  In so reasoning, the court 
seemed to attach “constitutional significance” to the factfinding of at least one 
aggravating factor, necessitating the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial 
and the accompanying “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof.81 
The Supreme Court’s recent emphasis that certain kinds of factfinding bear 
constitutional significance poses the questions of what other findings of fact 
bear constitutional significance and which constitutional guarantees are to be 
provided when findings of fact are determined to have such significance.82  In 
 
 72. Id. at 359–60 (“[T]he time invested in ascertaining the truth would surely be well spent if 
it makes the difference between life and death.”). 
 73. White, supra note 46, at 409. 
 74. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 75. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 76. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497. 
 77. Id. at 490. 
 78. Id. at 491–92. 
 79. Ring, 536 U.S. at 588–89. 
 80. Id. at 602 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81. See United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1124–31 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 82. See id. (dealing with the issues of what is constitutionally significant factfinding and 
whether the Confrontation Clause applies). 
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particular, the question becomes whether the findings of fact reserved to a jury 
pursuant to the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (FDPA)83 bear 
constitutional significance, and whether the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
confrontation subsequently extends to these findings of fact. 
C. The Federal Death Penalty Act: The More, the Better 
A jury is entrusted with several burdensome tasks under the FDPA.  
Specifically, the jury must proceed through six steps if a death sentence is to be 
handed down to the guilty defendant.  According to Judge Carter’s analysis in 
Mills, the entire jury must find: 
(1) that the statutory intent factor has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; 
(2) that at least one statutory aggravating factor has been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt; (3) that any additional statutory factors have been 
established beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) that any non-statutory aggravating 
factor has been established beyond a reasonable doubt; (5) whether any single 
juror has found a mitigating factor by preponderance of the evidence; and (6) 
“whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently 
outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence 
of death, or, in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating 
factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of death.”84 
Typically, the first two steps, which the government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt, are classified as part of what is called the “eligibility phase”; 
the final four steps, where the jury weighs all statutory and non-statutory 
factors, are part of the “selection phase.”85 
In these six steps, the statute provides that the government may introduce 
evidence relevant to the sentence, and the defense may introduce evidence 
relevant to a mitigating factor.86  The statute then declares: “Information is 
admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission 
of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if its 
probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.”87  Thus, the rules of evidence 
 
 83. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1959 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C.). 
 84. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1119–21 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3593) (other citations 
omitted).  For a list of the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (a)–
(c) (2006). 
 85. See United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1061–62 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (stating that the penalty phase is split 
into two “to avoid the Confrontation Clause problem by limiting evidence that purportedly 
implicated the Confrontation Clause to the selection phase, where the Confrontation Clause was 
not applicable, even if the Confrontation Clause was applicable to the eligibility phase”); see also 
supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2006). 
 87. Id. 
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have no place in FDPA sentencing proceedings.  Nevertheless, the pre-
Crawford and post-Crawford cases addressing treatment of the Sixth 
Amendment shed light as to whether the FDPA’s provision on evidence 
comports with the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation. 
D. United States v. Fell, Roberts, and the Confrontation Clause 
In its decision delivered just two days before the Supreme Court decided 
Crawford, the Second Circuit in United States v. Fell reversed the district court 
of Vermont’s declaration that the FDPA was unconstitutional because of its 
relatively lax evidentiary safeguards.88  The district court insisted that 
“heightened reliability” is essential if a court is to impose a death sentence and 
found the FDPA denied this reliability to the defendant.89  The Second Circuit 
agreed that “heightened reliability” was essential, but claimed “the FDPA does 
not undermine ‘heightened reliability,’ it promotes it.”90  The Second Circuit 
stated, “What the district court failed to acknowledge, however, is that the 
Supreme Court has also made clear that in order to achieve such ‘heightened 
reliability,’ more evidence, not less, should be admitted on the presence or 
absence of aggravating and mitigating factors[.]”91  The fact that the FDPA 
even bars evidence where the probative value is outweighed (not substantially 
outweighed) was more generous to the defendant than the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.92  The Court concluded with the imposing words, “So long as . . . 
defendants receive a fundamentally fair trial, the [FDPA] satisfies 
constitutional requirements.”93 
E. Post-Crawford Applications of the Confrontation Clause to the Penalty 
Phase 
Lower courts have applied Crawford in various ways to the penalty phase 
in capital proceedings.94  A few cases in particular show a gradual evolution 
toward applying Crawford to the eligibility portion of the penalty phase in 
capital proceedings, yet courts cite Williams in their reluctance to extend the 
Confrontation Clause any further. 
 
 88. Fell, 360 F.3d at 137. 
 89. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 485 (D. Vt. 2002) (relying largely on the 
newly delivered Ring decision). 
 90. Fell, 360 F.3d at 144. 
 91. Id. at 143 (drawing upon Williams in the assertion that more is better). 
 92. Id. at 145. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See infra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing different courts taking different 
tactics). 
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1. United States v. Jordan: Eligibility but Not Selection 
In United States v. Jordan,95 Judge Hudson of the Eastern District of 
Virginia found that the government could not introduce a witness’s grand jury 
testimony and other statements during the eligibility phase of the capital 
proceeding.96  The Jordan court based this decision on the premise that the 
eligibility phase is the “most critical” from a “constitutional perspective,” in 
that the intent and aggravating factors decided in the eligibility phase are the 
“functional equivalent of elements of the capital offense.”97  Thus, equating the 
eligibility phase with the trial phase, the Jordan court held that the defendant is 
to be protected by the Sixth Amendment safeguards, including the right to 
confrontation.98 
However, the Jordan court held that the right to confrontation did not 
extend to the selection phase.99  Judge Hudson reasoned, “Unlike the eligibility 
phase, the selection phase is intended to be less structured and less encumbered 
by strict adherence to the Rules of Evidence. . . . [T]he jury should ‘have as 
much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing 
decision.’”100  Seeming to rely on this intention of having a “less structured” 
proceeding, the Jordan court explained little more about its decision to apply 
the Confrontation Clause in such a manner.  Nevertheless, Jordan’s decision to 
apply the Confrontation Clause to the eligibility phase marked a gradual shift 
toward finding constitutional significance under the FDPA.101 
2. United States v. Johnson: Following in Jordan’s Footsteps 
In United States v. Johnson, the Northern District of Iowa answered the 
question of whether Crawford and Ring indicated extension of a defendant’s 
right to confrontation into the penalty phase of the trial, as did the Jordan and 
United States v. Bodkins courts.102  The court found the “constitutional 
 
 95. 357 F. Supp. 2d 889 (E.D.Va. 2005). 
 96. Id. at 903. 
 97. Id. at 902 (citing United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 298 (4th Cir. 2003)).  
Interestingly, the Jordan Court discusses Fell, yet here places the eligibility phase as 
constitutionally equivalent to the trial phase.  Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 903. 
 100. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 903 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203–04 
(1976)). 
 101. See United States v. Bodkins, WL 1118158, at *4–5 (W.D. Va. May 11, 2005) 
(following Jordan in holding that Crawford applies to the eligibility phase but not the selection 
phase). 
 102. United States v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1061 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (“Consistent 
with the constitutional safeguards identified by the United States Supreme Court, as interpreted 
by the Fourth Circuit, this Court is of the opinion that with respect to the eligibility phase of the 
penalty stage of a capital trial, the Confrontation Clause is equally applicable.” (quoting Jordan, 
357 F. Supp. 2d at 902–03) (emphasis added by court)). 
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safeguards” of the Confrontation Clause should apply to the eligibility phase 
just as they apply to the trial phase.103  Similarly, the court endorsed an 
ideology of “the more, the better” in refusing to apply Crawford to the 
selection phase by citing the Eighth Circuit’s recent proposition that “the 
confrontation clause does not apply in sentencing proceedings.”104  More 
importantly, the Johnson court quoted Jordan’s recognition of an absence of 
case law applying the Confrontation Clause to the selection phase of a capital 
proceeding.105  In doing so, the Johnson court recognized—yet declined the 
defense’s invitation to be—the first to expand the application of Crawford to 
the selection phase.106 
3. Uncharted Territory 
While the Second Circuit in Fell used strong language indicating the 
FDPA fully complied with the Constitution, the glaring mark on the record 
remains the fact that it was decided before Crawford.107  Although courts such 
as Jordan, Bodkins, and Johnson have all decided to extend Crawford to the 
eligibility phase, no court had ventured to apply Crawford to the selection 
phase of a capital proceeding.108  Moreover, no circuit court had even 
addressed the specific issue of whether the Confrontation Clause applied to the 
penalty phase at all.109  It is this hole created by Crawford and Ring, the 
unavailability of law at the circuit court level, and the sparse and hesitant 
district court decisions of Jordan, Bodkins, and Johnson that paved the way for 
Judge Carter’s order in United States v. Mills. 
IV.  JUDGE CARTER’S ANALYSIS IN MILLS 
On August 17, 2006, the Honorable Judge David O. Carter110 issued an 
unprecedented order regarding penalty phase procedures—he applied the 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1060–62 (quoting United States v. Wallace, 408 F.3d 1046, 1048 (8th Cir. 2005)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 105. Id. at 1061 (“[N]o court has applied the teachings of Ring beyond the statutory factors at 
issue in the eligibility phase.”) (citation omitted). 
 106. See id. at 1062. 
 107. See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text. 
 108. See infra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 109. The closest a court has come to addressing this issue was in United States v. Brown, 441 
F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2006).  The Court cited Jordan, Bodkins, and Johnson, yet concluded: 
We do not decide whether Crawford applies at the penalty phase of a federal capital trial 
precisely because the challenged evidence offered in this case was so clearly non-
testimonial. Moreover, we offer no opinion on the propriety of trifurcating a federal 
capital trial so that the penalty phase would be conducted in two distinct parts. 
Id. at 1362 n.12. 
 110. For background information on Judge Carter, see supra note 14. 
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Confrontation Clause to both the eligibility and selection phases.111  After a 
brief summary of the facts, the opinion began by explaining the FDPA.112  
Then the opinion methodically and logically proceeded through the various 
questions concerning precedent and the appropriateness of applying the 
Confrontation Clause to the penalty phase.113  After determining that the 
Confrontation Clause applied to the eligibility and selection phases, Judge 
Carter determined that much of what the government desired to introduce was 
testimonial, thus requiring the witness to be present for admission of the 
statements.114 
A. The Federal Death Penalty Act 
Judge Carter began with a brief explanation of the FDPA.115  In particular, 
Carter specifically pointed out that the bifurcated process of the penalty phase 
was created to ensure “a greater degree of reliability” because it is 
“qualitatively different from all other forms of punishment.”116  Carter 
explained the eligibility phase as the first two of six steps, enabling a jury to 
see whether a death sentence may even be imposed on a defendant, while the 
final four steps are a matter of weighing factors to decide whether the 
defendant should receive a sentence of death.117  While Section 3593(c) calls 
for the admission of evidence regardless of evidentiary rules (unless the 
“probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, or misleading the jury”),118 the overriding question 
remained whether the Constitution, in particular the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause, allowed for the admission of such evidence.119 
B. Right to Confrontation During Capital Sentencing 
Judge Carter referenced the recent change in Sixth Amendment law under 
Crawford and Davis120—specifically how the change in law and recent 
Supreme Court decisions have led the prosecution, the defense, and the Mills 
court itself to “struggle[] to apply” the Confrontation Clause.121 
 
 111. United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 112. Id. at 1119–21.  For a similar explanation, see supra Part III.C. 
 113. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1121–35. 
 114. Id. at 1135–40. 
 115. Id. at 1119; see supra Part III.C. 
 116. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. Id. 
 118. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2006). 
 119. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d  at 1120. 
 120. Id. at 1121.  Note that Judge Carter’s order came only two months after the Supreme 
Court decided Davis.  Id.  For a discussion of the drastic change in Confrontation Clause law and 
the importance it bears, see supra Part II. 
 121. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. 
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1. Williams v. New York and Broad Discretion in Sentencing 
Judge Carter sought to answer whether the Confrontation Clause applies to 
the eligibility phase, the selection phase, both, or neither by examining 
Williams.122  Judge Carter called attention to the Williams assertion that “a 
judge’s ability to exercise broad discretion at sentencing should not be 
restricted by limitations on uncross-examined hearsay evidence.”123  The trial 
judge was affirmed in Williams in his ability to consult a “probation report and 
other sources” off the record, effectively giving judges “wide discretion in 
sentencing,” which did not require any amount of confrontation.124 
However, Judge Carter noted the evolution in death penalty jurisprudence, 
the resulting newfound constitutional rights for the defendants, and the overall 
“maturing case law recogniz[ing] the unique nature of death as the ultimate 
penalty and the concomitant need for heightened procedural protections.”125  
Here, Judge Carter seemed to depart from Williams and follow Gardner’s 
implications of change in the notion of “death is different.”126  Rather than 
place himself in an ostentatious and contravening position of deciding whether 
Williams is good law for the situation, Judge Carter specifically stated that the 
sentencing scheme under the FDPA is different from that of Williams in that it 
“places the ultimate sentencing decision with the jury.”127 
2. Constitutional Significance of Factfinding 
Judge Carter then proceeded to determine whether the FDPA’s shift of 
sentencing power to the jury designated such factfinding “constitutionally 
significant.”  Judge Carter began this inquiry by turning to Specht v. 
Patterson.128  The Supreme Court in Specht unanimously reversed a Colorado 
judge’s enhancing of a sentence, holding that because the additional sentence 
relied upon a factfinding by the judge of an ingredient absent from the offense 
charged, it violated due process.129  Specifically, such a factfinding denied the 
defendant the right “[to] be confronted with witnesses against him, [and] have 
the right to cross-examine.”130  Judge Carter concluded, “Therefore, once the 
activity of a sentencer stops being an exercise of discretion and becomes 
constitutionally significant factfinding, the right to confrontation attaches.”131  
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1123 n.5. 
 125. Id. at 1123. 
 126. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1124; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 127. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1124. 
 128. Id. (citing  Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967)). 
 129. Specht, 386 U.S. at 608; Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. 
 130. Specht, 386 U.S. at 610. 
 131. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. 
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While Specht assisted Judge Carter reaching this conclusion, it failed to answer 
what constitutes constitutionally significant factfinding. 
To answer this, Judge Carter delved deeper into the Supreme Court cases 
of Apprendi and Ring.  Apprendi importantly prohibited judges from enhancing 
a punishment beyond the punishment established for the offense of which a 
defendant has been found guilty.132  Thus, “any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”133 
Judge Carter then noted that in Ring, the Supreme Court similarly struck 
down an Arizona death penalty statute where the judge, among other 
requirements, was to find an aggravating factor.134  Judge Carter concluded, 
“However, Ring left open the question of whether facts found as part of the 
‘selection’ function must be the subject of jury findings, with all of the 
attendant constitutional protections.”135  Thus, even though the Sixth 
Amendment jury provision applies to the eligibility phase, does the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause apply to the selection phase where a jury is 
present as mandated under the FDPA? 
Judge Carter looked elsewhere in evaluating the apparent trends of courts, 
veering from Williams, and coming closer to the rationale endorsed by 
Gardner.  Some courts tend to follow Williams strictly in a capital context; 
some have opined that Williams should no longer be followed; others have 
“sought to avoid the issue”; and still other courts have applied the 
Confrontation Clause “to the penalty phase without noting any controversy 
regarding its applicability.” 136 
Judge Carter noted that the Jordan court had addressed the very question at 
bar and had answered that Crawford barred testimonial statements during the 
eligibility phase in a death proceeding but not in the selection phase.137  Carter 
agreed to follow in Jordan’s footsteps with respect to applying Crawford to the 
eligibility phase.138  However, he expressly disagreed with Jordan’s “the more, 
the better” rationale, 139 stating, “while the Court recognizes the policy reasons 
encouraging the admission of the maximum quantum of evidence during the 
 
 132. Id. at 1126; see supra Part III.C. 
 133. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 
(2000)). 
 134. Id. at 1127. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1128 (citation omitted). 
 137. Id. at 1129. 
 138. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1129. 
 139. Id. (citing United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903 (E.D. Va. 2005)). 
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selection phase, that policy is insufficient to override Defendants’ right to 
confront witnesses during such a critical portion of the capital trial.”140 
Judge Carter re-fixed his focus on constitutionally significant factfinding 
by examining two recent Supreme Court decisions.141  In Blakely v. 
Washington, the Supreme Court struck down a judge’s decision to sentence a 
defendant to ninety months after finding aggravating circumstances, when the 
standard range prescribed by the Sentencing Reform Act (rather than the 
statute’s ten year maximum) was from forty-nine to fifty-three months.142  The 
Court concluded, “[T]he relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum 
he may impose without any additional findings.”143  In Blakely, the judge 
overstepped constitutional boundaries by finding aggravating circumstances to 
deliver an enhanced sentence.144  The jury’s findings in Mills and (after Booker 
and United States v. Green145) under the FDPA constrain a judge by 
authorizing a specific sentence.146  Judge Carter agreed that any factfinding 
done beyond what the trial jury’s verdict reflects, necessarily, is 
constitutionally significant factfinding.147  Indeed, the Green court found all 
factors (statutory and non-statutory) to be weighed by the factfinder were 
“legally essential.”148  Finally, Judge Carter concluded that the weighing 
process trusted to the jury by the FDPA is set forth in such a fashion that 
“bear[s] many of the hallmarks of constitutionally significant facts falling 
under the ambit of Blakely.”149  Thus, because the jury in the selection phase 
engages in constitutionally significant factfinding, the defendant must be 
afforded “the same constitutional protections as those which accompany [him 
during] the trial of elements”—necessarily meaning Crawford, Davis, and the 
right to confrontation.150 
 
 140. Id. at 1130 (pointing out that Jordan failed to examine “Supreme Court decisions 
expanding the constitutional significance of factfinding as established by Ring”). 
 141. Although Judge Carter also addressed United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), in 
his decision, the author only discusses Blakely in this section. 
 142. 542 U.S. 296, 303–04, 314 (2004). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. 372 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 146. See United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“For when a 
trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the 
defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.” (quoting 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005))). 
 147. Id. at 1135. 
 148. Id. at 1133 (citation omitted). 
 149. Id. at 1133–35 (taking the middle road of “constitutionally significant factfinding” 
between the two extreme options of “pure factfinding” and “pure sentencing discretion”). 
 150. Id. at 1135. 
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C. Crawford’s Application in the Present Penalty Phase 
After Judge Carter’s exhaustive discussion on the applicability of the 
Confrontation Clause to both the eligibility and the selection phases, he turned 
to defendants Mills and Bingham of the Aryan Brotherhood and the case at 
bar.151  Judge Carter defined the standard of the Confrontation Clause after 
Crawford and Davis: “If the statement was made by a person who would 
reasonably believe his statement would be available for use at a later trial, then 
it must be excluded under Crawford, notwithstanding the fact that the report 
itself was not prepared in anticipation for trial.”152  He then proceeded to bar 
several evidentiary propositions and allow others,153 closing his order with 
strong words concerning the death penalty: 
Death is fundamentally different from all other forms of punishment.  Because 
the death penalty is uniquely different in its finality and severity, increased 
scrutiny is required at every step of the capital process to ensure that death is 
the appropriate penalty.  Capital jurisprudence has traveled far from the time 
when death was automatic.  This Court’s holding is in line with maturing 
federal death penalty jurisprudence and its recognition of the need for 
increased reliability in capital sentencing.154 
V.  ANALYSIS OF THE MILLS DECISION 
The Mills decision, because it was the first case to apply Crawford to the 
selection phase of a capital proceeding, was certainly a radical departure from 
the admittedly sparse, non-controlling case law which existed at the time.155  
While Mills had no controlling case law to follow, the question remains 
whether Mills’s holding and rationale are correct.  As this analysis of the 
decision will show, Judge Carter’s holding was correct, although the rationale 
was somewhat tenuous. 
A. Crawford and Ring: Non-Dispositive Yet Insightful Dicta 
The Mills decision correctly found that Crawford and Ring were not 
dispositive of the issue at hand.156  While the Mills court should not have based 
its argument on Crawford’s dicta, Judge Carter should have acknowledged 
 
 151. See Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1135–39 (allowing presentence investigation reports and 
minor IDC reports to be admitted during the penalty phase, but barring descriptions in 
presentence investigation reports relying upon investigative reports, post-sentence reports, 
internal prison memoranda documenting information transmitted from “unidentified inmate 
witnesses,” “snitches,” and a witness’s grand jury testimony). 
 152. Id. at 1136. 
 153. See id. at 1136–39. 
 154. Id. at 1140. 
 155. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1121–22, 1127. 
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Crawford’s lessons.  Particularly, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Crawford begins 
with a historical narrative of the right to confront one’s accuser(s).157  At the 
fore of this narrative was Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial, whereupon “the jury 
convicted, and Raleigh was sentenced to death.”158  It was the jury who made 
findings of fact and returned a guilty verdict that carried with it a mandatory 
death sentence.159  Although this historical connection is temporally removed 
from the Confrontation Clause as it currently stands, it is still significant 
because Scalia called attention to the right to confront one’s accusers by 
drawing upon history and citing a case where the jury considered an out-of-
court testimonial statement in finding Raleigh guilty of a crime where he must 
be sentenced to death.160  While the Mills court (or the Jordan, Bodkins, and 
Johnson courts, for that matter) did not note this line of reasoning, which could 
be deduced from Crawford, failure to do so was hardly fatal. 
While Crawford’s historical narrative provides some insight into the issue, 
Ring’s dicta strongly suggests the Sixth Amendment should apply to the 
eligibility phase.  Indeed, this was one of the most logically sound points 
presented in Mills.  According to the court in Mills: 
Although Ring extends the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial to the 
eligibility phase, it does not squarely address the right presently at issue: 
namely, the right to confrontation.  However, the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
Ring strongly suggests that the Confrontation Clause also applies to the 
eligibility phase, in contravention of the Court’s earlier holding in Williams.161 
 
 157. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43–50 (2004). 
 158. Id. at 44 (“Raleigh demanded that the judges call him to appear, arguing that ‘[t]he Proof 
of the Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it.  Call my 
accuser before my face. . . .’  The judges refused, and, despite Raleigh’s protestations that he was 
being tried ‘by the Spanish Inquisition’, the jury convicted, and Raleigh was sentenced to death.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 159. Id.; see CHARLES KNIGHT, POLITICAL DICTIONARY; FORMING A WORK OF UNIVERSAL 
REFERENCE, BOTH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL; AND EMBRACING THE TERMS OF CIVIL 
ADMINISTRATION, OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS, AND OF ALL THE MORE 
IMPORTANT STATISTICAL DEPARTMENTS OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE 187–88 (Charles Knight 
and Co. 1846) (noting that death was prescribed for the crime of High Treason under English 
Law); see also infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (“‘[T]he justice of England has never been so degraded 
and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh.’” (quoting DAVID JARDINE, 1 
CRIMINAL TRIALS 520 (1832))).  A (perhaps more) persuasive counterargument is that the jury in 
Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial was merely responsible for assessing culpability, where the statute itself 
prescribed the punishment.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to ignore the fact that the jury would be 
fully aware of the consequences of a guilty verdict. 
 161. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1127–28. 
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Focusing on Ring in this matter elicited a strong argument for applying 
Crawford to both the eligibility and selection phases, as it convincingly 
reaffirmed the importance of Williams and Gardner.162 
B. The Crux of the Argument: Williams After Ring 
The crux of Mills’s logical progression was correctly placed on the extent 
to which Williams is good law after Ring.163  Ring may have answered the 
question of when to apply the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury without 
mentioning Williams whatsoever, yet the original holding of Williams is 
undeniably narrowed by Ring. 
To be specific, Williams stood for the proposition that a judge could 
consult additional materials (specifically a presentence report involving out-of-
court statements) in imposing the death sentence on a defendant.164  However, 
Ring’s statement that “[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant’s 
authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter 
how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”165 
contravenes Williams’s statement that “[w]e cannot say that the due-process 
clause renders a sentence void merely because a judge gets additional out-of-
court information to assist him in the exercise of this awesome power of 
imposing the death sentence.”166 
However, Mills uses Harris v. United States167 in arriving at the conclusion 
that “Ring left open the question of whether facts found as part of the 
‘selection’ function must be the subject of jury findings, with all of the 
attendant constitutional protections.”168  This conclusion is weak, at best.  
Harris is a non-capital case dealing with the issue of whether Apprendi 
attached to the raising of a mandatory minimum sentence by a judge.169  
According to Harris, “Judicial factfinding in the course of selecting a sentence 
within the authorized range does not implicate the indictment, jury-trial, and 
reasonable doubt components of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”170  Even 
though the trial judge in Ring engaged in the very factual determination 
prescribed by Arizona statute, which included finding at least one aggravating 
 
 162. See id. at 1122–24, 1128. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949); see also supra note 57 and 
accompanying text. 
 165. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002). 
 166. Williams, 337 U.S. at 252 (relying on “fundamental fairness” conception of due process). 
 167. 536 U.S. 545 (2002). 
 168. United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 169. Harris, 536 U.S. at 551 (quoted in Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 n.10). 
 170. Id. at 558 (quoted in Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 n.10). 
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factor and weighing it against any mitigating factors,171 the Supreme Court 
reversed, holding the judge was barred from making any findings of fact as to 
aggravating factors “necessary for imposition of the death penalty” in a capital 
proceeding’s unbifurcated penalty phase.172 
As the FDPA structures the penalty phase of a capital proceeding, Mills 
helpfully, yet perhaps misleadingly, divides the process into six steps.173  
Particularly, bifurcating the process set out by the FDPA confuses the 
constitutional issues more than it helps to clarify their application.  The statute 
dictates that “imposition of a sentence of death is justified” after the jury’s 
“consideration of the factors set forth in section 3592 in the course of a hearing 
held pursuant to section 3593.”174  The FDPA reiterates that after intent and at 
least one statutory aggravating factor are found beyond a reasonable doubt, 
“the jury . . . shall consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found 
to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist 
to justify a sentence of death . . . by unanimous vote . . . .”175  Thus, the jury is 
given the responsibility of finding aggravating factors during the final four of 
Mills’s steps.176  Yet, in light of Ring, these final four steps, involving the 
finding of aggravating factors, are “necessary for imposition of the death 
penalty,” and thus constitutionally require a jury.177  In other words, the 
bifurcation of a sentencing scheme does not constitutionally require a jury for 
one phase but not the other—the Constitution requires a jury in the penalty 
phase in its entirety, so long as aggravating factors are being found beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Harris is immaterial to this analysis because a death 
sentence is not “authorized” until all aggravating factors (whether statutory or 
non-statutory) are found beyond a reasonable doubt.178  For, as Justice Scalia 
insightfully stated in his concurrence in Ring: 
I believe that the fundamental meaning of the jury trial guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment 
that the defendant receives—whether the statute calls them elements of the 
 
 171. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 592–93 (2002) (“[T]he judge is to determine the presence 
or absence of the enumerated ‘aggravating circumstances’ and any ‘mitigating circumstances.’  
The State’s law authorizes the judge to sentence the defendant to death only if there is at least one 
aggravating circumstance and ‘there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to 
call for leniency.’” (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F))). 
 172. Id. at 592–93, 609. 
 173. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1119–20; see also supra Part III.C. 
 174. 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2006). 
 175. Id. § 3593(e). 
 176. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1120. 
 177. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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offense, sentencing facts, or Mary Jane—must be found by the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.179 
The facts determined by the jury in the selection phase are “essential” in that 
the judge bases her final imposition of life or death on these facts, and thus the 
nature of the facts being found in the selection phase constitutionally 
necessitates that it be done by a jury.180 
Thus, in applying Ring to the FDPA’s procedures, a jury is not only 
statutorily prescribed but constitutionally mandated to engage in all factfinding 
occurring in all six steps.181  Ring limits Williams to the extent that a judge is 
no longer free to consult additional aggravating factors unless found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Mills court ultimately came to this 
conclusion, but only after assuming that Ring left this question open182 and 
subsequently consulting Green, Booker, and Blakely to justify an extension of 
Ring.183  Ring did not leave this question open and Mills’s consideration of 
other cases is helpful but unnecessary.  Nevertheless, Mills eventually arrived 
at the correct conclusion—that the factfinding occurring in the penalty phase 
was of constitutional significance. 184 
C. Death Is Different 
Whereas this exhaustive discussion of Ring et al. discusses the rule of law 
(or lack thereof), almost equally important is the policy discussion as to why 
capital defendants should be provided with the constitutional safeguard of 
confrontation.  Mills prudently called attention to the principle that “death is 
 
 179. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 180. See supra Part III.C. 
 181. See supra notes 163–180 and accompanying text.  The counterargument is any 
factfinding occurring in the selection phase does not go to enhance or increase a punishment by 
the facts which the jury has found beyond a reasonable doubt in the eligibility phase.  However, 
the jury further considers additional statutory aggravating factors, non-statutory aggravating 
factors, and mitigating factors before making their recommendation.  See supra Part III.C.  The 
judge, in light of the recommendation, imposes the sentence, which necessarily consults facts 
found by the jury in the selection phase.  The fact that this determination is based on additional 
facts found by the jury deems the facts found by the jury in the selection phase as 
“constitutionally significant” under Ring.  See supra notes 164–181 and accompanying text. 
 182. United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 183. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 184. The Jordan, Bodkins, and Johnson courts thus wrongly interpreted Ring.  See supra note 
150 and accompanying text.  Had these courts interpreted Ring in this suggested manner (the 
Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury applies wholesale to the FDPA’s scheme of factfinding) and 
recognized the constitutional significance of the penalty phase proceedings, their logical analyses 
would have led them to conclude the Confrontation Clause applies to the entirety of the penalty 
phase.  See supra note 105. 
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different” in the order, 185 but did not allow such a theory to take precedence 
over the legal issues.186  Mills’s penultimate paragraph tastefully reminds us 
that death is “fundamentally different from all other forms of punishment” and 
“uniquely different in its finality and severity.”187  Mills’s placement of these 
assertions effectively called attention to the policy of the ultimate decision in 
Mills without rendering the order a patently judicially activist order. 
D. Post-Mills Case Law 
Cases decided after the Mills decision was handed down on August 17, 
2006 both challenged and supported the Mills outcome.  In particular, United 
States v. Fields and Summers v. State declined invitations to extend the right to 
confrontation in the selection phase of capital cases.188  United States v. 
Concepcion Sablan examined the Mills-Jordan discrepancy—and followed 
Mills.189  These cases, at the very least, cast a shadow of uncertainty over the 
law espoused in Mills. 
1. Fields: Williams Is Dispositive for Selection Phase 
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of confrontation at the penalty phase 
in Fields and concluded the right extends only to the eligibility phase (not to 
the selection phase).190  The majority opinion largely relied on Williams, 
stating, “caselaw definitively maintains the Williams principle in the noncapital 
context and establishes that the right does not apply at sentencing.”191  
Following this, the majority concluded that the right to confrontation should 
not extend to capital sentencing selection proceedings when the right is absent 
 
 185. See Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1123 (“[D]eath penalty jurisprudence has evolved 
significantly in recognition of a capital defendant’s constitutional rights. . . .  The maturing case 
law recognizes the unique nature of death as the ultimate penalty and the concomitant need for 
heightened procedural protections.”). 
 186. See id. at 1119–31 (analyzing Williams, Ring, Jordan, Booker, Blakely, and Green). 
 187. Id. at 1140 (briefly discussing “[d]eath is . . . different” in the disposition section). 
 188. United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 335 (5th Cir. 2007) (refusing to apply 
Confrontation Clause to selection phase); Summers v. State, 148 P.3d 778, 783 (Nev. 2006) 
(refusing to apply Confrontation Clause to penalty phase under Nevada statute). 
 189. United States v. Concepcion Sablan, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1221 (D. Colo. 2007) 
(“Having independently analyzed Ring, Apprendi, Booker, and Blakely, I agree with Mills that 
under Crawford, the Confrontation Clause is applicable at both the eligibility phase and at least a 
portion of the selection phase.”). 
 190. Fields, 483 F.3d at 335 (“Neither the text of the Sixth Amendment nor the history of 
murder trials supports the extension of the Confrontation Clause to testimony relevant only to 
penalty selection in a capital case.”). 
 191. Id. at 332.  The Fields Court did not address the issue of Ring and any effect it may or 
may not have had on Williams. 
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from noncapital proceedings.192  Quoting John G. Douglass’s law review 
article,193 the Fields court rejected the argument that the issue of life and death 
changes the analysis, concluding, “[w]hen it comes to Sixth Amendment rights 
at sentencing, it seems, death is not so different after all.”194 
The Fields dissent focused on, among others, the history of confrontation 
during capital proceedings.195  The dissent pointed out: 
At the time the Confrontation Clause was written, a capital trial was a single, 
unified proceeding at which both guilt and sentence were decided.  The 
Framers knew nothing of capital sentencing proceedings separate from 
trial. . . . 
  . . . . 
  The critical point is this: because these de facto capital sentencing 
proceedings took the form of full criminal trials, the defendant possessed full 
trial rights of confrontation.  However, the notion that capital sentencing might 
be conducted “outside of an adversarial trial” is strictly a “post-constitutional” 
phenomenon.196 
The majority flat-out rejected this argument, arguing “[t]his logic is flawed” in 
that noncapital proceedings, as the Framers knew them, did not allow for 
confrontation of one’s accusers.197  In this way, the Fields majority clings to 
Williams in determining that an extension of the right to confrontation is not 
constitutionally mandated and quite simply unprecedented.198 
2. Summers: Williams Is Dispositive and Unbifurcated Proceedings 
Like Fields, Summers based its decision on Williams, finding that the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply in the penalty phase.199  In a relatively 
short opinion, Summers noted that Williams had been called into doubt, but it 
 
 192. Id. (“Given that, as shown above, no other Sixth Amendment right has been applied (vel 
non) differently at capital sentencing from how it is applied at noncapital sentencing, there is little 
reason to establish divergent rules with regard to the confrontation right when the sentencing 
authority is selecting a sentence from within an authorized range.”). 
 193. Douglass, supra note 3.  For other citations to Douglass’s aforementioned article, see 
Fields, 483 F.3d at 368 n.7 (Benavides, J., dissenting); United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 
1115, 1122 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 194. Fields, 483 F.3d at 331 (quoting Douglass, supra note 3, at 1993). 
 195. Id. at 370–71 (Benavides, J., dissenting). 
 196. Id. at 370–71 (quoting Douglass, supra note 3, at 2016) (citations omitted). 
 197. Id. at 335 (majority opinion). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Summers v. State, 148 P.3d 778, 782 (Nev. 2006) (“Guiding our decision today is the 
Supreme Court’s 1949 opinion Williams v. New York. . . .  [I]n our view . . . it remains good 
law.”).  Whereas Fields applied the Confrontation Clause to the eligibility but not the selection 
phase under the FDPA, Fields, 483 F.3d at 332, Summers considered the Clause’s application to 
an unbifurcated Nevada state sentencing hearing.  Summers, 148 P.3d at 780, 783. 
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remained “good law” in the Ninth Circuit.200  In addition, as in Crawford, the 
court found “no intent or basis to extend the Sixth Amendment to capital 
penalty hearings.”201  In ruling that the right to confrontation did not extend to 
the penalty phase, the Summers court determined Nevada’s unbifurcated 
capital proceedings comported with the Constitution because juries were 
competent enough to exclude testimonial, out-of-court statements when finding 
a defendant eligible to receive a death sentence.202 
As though responding to the Fields majority, the dissent in Summers stated 
that “[t]he majority opinion relies on a fifty-seven-year-old United States 
Supreme Court case that was decided well before any of the United States 
Supreme Court’s more recent death penalty pronouncements” and that the 
Court “has given very clear indications that Williams v. New York is no longer 
viable.”203  However, the dissent stops short of advocating application of the 
Confrontation Clause to the entire penalty phase by stating that there is “no 
basis in either Ring or Crawford to extend to the Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right to the selection phase of a capital hearing.”204  The court 
found that the selection phase required a “broad inquiry” in which “the 
sentencer decides the actual sentence based on the offense, which has already 
been established, and its accompanying sentencing parameters.”205  In this 
way, not only does the Summers majority think that Crawford should not apply 
to the penalty phase at all, but the dissent also believes the selection phase 
should be free from the restraint of the right to confrontation.206 
3. Concepcion Sablan: Constitutionally Significant Factfinding and 
Procedural Difficulty 
Judge Wiley Y. Daniel issued a startling opinion on February 26, 2007, 
where the district court of Colorado became the first and only court to follow 
in Mills’s footsteps.207  In Concepcion Sablan, the court examined the 
opposing decisions of Jordan and Mills and found that the Mills school of 
thought prevailed primarily for two distinct reasons.208  First, the court agreed 
with the legal principal that the factfinding conducted during the eligibility and 
 
 200. Summers, 148 P.3d at 782. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 783–84. 
 203. Id. at 784–85 (Rose, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 204. Id. at 787–88. 
 205. Summers, 148 P.3d at 788 (quoting Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998)). 
 206. See supra notes 199–205 and accompanying text. 
 207. See United States v. Concepcion Sablan, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1218–19 (D. Colo. 2007) 
(finding no circuit court opinions regarding whether Crawford applies to the sentencing phase of 
a death penalty proceeding, but that two district courts—Jordan and Mills—address the issue). 
 208. Id. at 1219–22. 
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selection phases was constitutionally significant. 209  To this issue, the court 
explained as follows: 
[U]nder the structure of the FDPA, it is not the finding of a statutory 
aggravating factor that actually increases the punishment.  The fact that 
actually increases the punishment is the existence of all the aggravating factors 
found by the jury (taken together) which the jury finds justify a sentence of 
death.  Indeed, the jury is not allowed to recommend a sentence of death until 
it considers whether all the aggravating . . . factors found to exist sufficiently 
outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence 
of death, or, in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating 
factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of death.210 
Secondly, the Concepcion Sablan court took a more practical approach in 
applying the Confrontation Clause to the entirety of the sentencing phase.  
Bifurcation of the sentencing phase into eligibility and selection portions was 
“a procedure not foreseen by the FDPA,” and which would “‘invite 
gamesmanship on the part of the government in allocating statutory 
aggravators between eligibility and selection.’”211  Moreover, in allowing the 
government to first introduce evidence during the eligibility phase to prove the 
statutory aggravating factor, and then allowing the government to introduce 
new testimonial out-of-court statements (otherwise banned by Crawford) in the 
selection phase to prove the same aggravating factor, would be “confusing to 
the jury.”212  While the Concepcion Sablan court remained relatively terse on 
formulating its own independent reasoning for adopting Mills, its emphasis on 
constitutionally significant factfinding and procedural difficulty spoke strongly 
to the issue at hand. 
E. Mills’s Impact 
Mills, in holding that Crawford and the Confrontation Clause apply to both 
the eligibility and selection phases in an FDPA proceeding, remains the first of 
only two courts to come to this conclusion.213  In addition, Mills undeniably is 
contained by its classification as a district-level decision out of California.  
 
 209. Id. at 1221. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 1222 (quoting United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1131 n.16 (C.D. Cal. 
2006)). 
 212. Concepcion Sablan, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1222. 
 213. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.  A few state courts have come to the 
conclusion that Crawford applies to the entire sentencing phase in a capital case.  See, e.g., 
Respondent’s Supplemental Brief at 10, California v. Fuiava, No. S055652, 2008 WL 2337455 
(Cal. May 9, 2008) (citing Rodgers v. State, 948 So.2d 655 (Fla. 2006)) (offering very little legal 
reasoning while citing a pre-Crawford Florida Supreme Court case in finding Crawford should 
apply to all three phases of a death penalty case).  Such cases are unhelpful for the purposes of the 
present legal analysis. 
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Previous cases such as Jordan, Bodkins, and Johnson refused to rule as Mills 
ruled, and later cases such as Fields and Summers declined to follow the 
logical progression employed by Mills.214  In short, there are many areas 
indicating Mills has a slight, if any, impact on American jurisprudence. 
However, given the relative recentness of the Supreme Court decisions of 
Ring (2002), Crawford (2004), and Davis (2006), Mills may have more of an 
impact than one may initially suspect.  At the least, the dissents in both Fields 
and Summers cite Mills.215  The growing discontent with Williams (1949) as 
being good law, as noticed in the Summers dissent, reveals that the evolution of 
the Confrontation Clause’s application in the penalty phase is relatively 
young.216  Mills serves to place a theoretical debate, posited by Douglass’s 
article, for example, into practice.217  By doing so, the absence of a Supreme 
Court decision on the issue becomes glaringly obvious, highlighting the need 
for a decision determining the application of Crawford to capital sentencing 
hearings in general.  In light of Concepcion Sablan, Mills could very well stand 
as the first in a long line of cases to come to afford defendants the right to 
confrontation in life or death situations. 
Practically speaking, Barry Mills and T.D. Bingham were afforded the 
constitutional safeguard of confrontation during both the eligibility and 
selection phases.218  While it is impossible to say whether this safeguard had an 
effect on the jury’s recommendation, the jury was “deadlocked” 9-3 in favor of 
death with respect to Mills and 8-4 in favor of life for Bingham.219  
Furthermore, the decision may have an impact on courts in the Central District 
of California in determining confrontation rights for the remaining defendants 
of the original twenty-three, for whom the government seeks death. 
CONCLUSION 
The case law regarding a criminal defendant’s right to confrontation during 
the penalty phase is sparse and ambiguous.  Combining the evolution of death 
penalty jurisprudence since Williams with the recent decisions of Ring and 
Crawford suggests a vast transformation in Sixth Amendment rights is 
underway.  Being in the midst of this transformation, Mills departed from 
previous decisions in holding that the right to confrontation not only extends 
into the eligibility portion of the penalty phase, but also to the selection 
 
 214. See supra Parts III.E. & V.D. 
 215. See United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 363 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) (Benavides, J., 
dissenting); Summers v. State, 148 P.3d 778, 787 n.29 (Nev. 2006) (Rose, J., dissenting). 
 216. See Summers, 148 P.3d at 786 (Rose, J., dissenting); but see supra note 199 and 
accompanying text. 
 217. See  Douglass, supra note 3. 
 218. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 219. Christopher Goffard, Prison Gang Leaders Get Life Terms, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006, 
at B3. 
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portion.  Mills will certainly have an impact on the legal community to the 
extent that it highlights the importance and controversy surrounding the debate.  
Although a countervailing argument may posit “the more, the better” with 
respect to the admission of evidence in the penalty phase, a constitutional right 
belongs to the defendant to invoke or to waive, and Mills was the first to 
recognize such an assertion to such an extent.220  Indeed, just as Justice Gawdy 
realized “the justice of England has never been so degraded and injured as by 
the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh,”221 so too may Mills spur a Supreme 
Court Justice to realize the justice of America will have never been so 
degraded and injured as by the condemnation of those who have not been 
afforded the right to confrontation in capital sentencing proceedings. 
ROBERT T. PLUNKERT 
 
 220. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607 (2002) (“The Sixth Amendment jury trial right, 
however, does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential 
factfinders.”). 
 221. JARDINE, supra note 160, at 520. 
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